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1. Introduction 
 
In the last few decades, philosophers have been involved in an exten-
sive and animated discussion about realism. As is well known, the word 
‘realism’ appears in various philosophical contexts, e.g. in semantics, 
metaphysics, epistemology, ethics, philosophy of mathematics, philoso-
phy of art, political theory, etc.1 Remarkably, in each of these fields, the 
word ‘realism’ assumes different, heterogeneous meanings. Being a re-
alist in ethics, for instance, has little or no influence over one’s attitude 
towards realism in science, and so on. Accordingly, realism cannot be 
considered an all-embracing philosophical position.2 To a certain extent, 
some forms of realism might show a certain “family resemblance,” and 
the various realists possibly use certain specific sets of keywords more 
frequently than non-realists. Nevertheless, different realisms cannot be 
unified within a single doctrine. Most of those who are committed to re-
alism within a single sector of the philosophical debate would not con-
sider necessary, or even desirable, to embrace realism in a more general, 
comprehensive sense. Though this is true, some philosophers still epit-
omize their own theoretical position as ‘realism’ – sometimes as ‘new 
realism’ – without further specification.3 This might prima facie suggest 
that they do consider many (or some) forms of realism connected, but 
this inference would not be correct. Rather, what self-declared realists 
tout court usually mean is that they are realists in metaphysics or – more 
precisely – in ontology. To put it in a nutshell, ontological realists usual-
                                                 
1 See e.g. French, Uehling and Wettstein 1988. The volume provides a survey of many 
aspects of the debate concerning realism, including moral theory. See also the recently 
updated entry “Realism” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Miller 2014).  
2 To my knowledge, at least, no one has claimed for a substantial linkage between the 
above mentioned independent semantic domains of the word ‘realism.’  
3 See e.g. Ferraris 2012. De Caro and Ferraris 2012. Gabriel 2014.  
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ly assume that things that belong to the world “out there” do not depend 
on our thoughts, mental schemes, categories, or linguistic practices, and 
so on. From this point of view, the way things occur in the world is fun-
damentally independent of whatever people may think (or not think) 
about it. Rather than a philosophical insight, this might seem a com-
monsensical or uncontroversial tenet.4 Yet realists insist that many phi-
losophers endorse the opposite view, and therefore that realism needs to 
be reaffirmed against sophisticated anti-realistic trends in philosophy. 
These trends are typically represented by idealist or nihilist thinkers.  
One of the favorite polemic targets of the new realist wave is Im-
manuel Kant. However, Kant vehemently and correctly protested against 
those who tendentiously interpreted his thought as an ingenuous, rather 
than critical (or transcendental), form of idealism.5 Although a discus-
sion of Kant’s philosophical stance is not part of this work, in § 4 I shall 
touch upon the fact that Kant never argued for anti-realism in ontology; 
rather, and more interestingly, he made claim to a philosophy free from 
ontological presuppositions. As far as nihilism is concerned, the analysis 
is no less interesting. Obviously, nihilists do not simply assume that 
nothing exists. More often, they try to challenge our (instinctive or culti-
vated) belief in the value of metaphysical notions such as truth, reality, 
goodness, and so on. Nietzsche’s verbal vehemence against the idoliza-
tion of facts – as in his famous sentence “there are no facts, only inter-
pretations” – must be considered within the context of the controversy 
against positivistic philosophy prevalent at that time.6 
                                                 
4 In her insightful book (D’Agostini 2013), Franca D’Agostini argues for the inseparability 
of the categories of reality and truth, so that (ontological) anti-realism becomes a self-
confuting theory. Despite D’Agostini’s ample and well-grounded discussion, I believe that 
reality and truth should be considered separately.  
5 See e.g. Sassen 1997; for a textual survey Sassen 2000. Kant’s early critics, Sassen 
demonstrates, were puzzled by a philosophy that, in Johann Feder’s words, “makes 
objects.” As is well known, Kant replies to them with his Prolegomena of 1783 and in the 
second edition of his Critique of Pure Reason (1787). 
6 Nietzsche 1980, 7.60: “Gegen den Positivismus, welcher bei dem Phänomen stehen bleibt 
“es giebt nur Thatsachen,” würde ich sagen: nein, gerade Thatsachen giebt es nicht, nur 
Interpretationen” (emphasis added). Even the insistence of hermeneutics upon the 
inescapable circle of interpretation does not seriously challenge the world’s existence, 
unless one considers hermeneutics as a form of ontology – as Heidegger did, yet without 
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Still, realists are right in assuming that philosophers have often at-
tempted to put a limit on naïve ontological realism. Some very typical 
problems with the postulates of realism are of the following kind: what 
is the real meaning of the claim that the things “out there” are inde-
pendent of us? How are we supposed to know about them? How are we 
supposed to know about their independence from us? Moreover, what 
about ourselves? Are we merely part of this world of things “out there?” 
If we are indeed, what is the world of things independent from? If we 
are not, what about us as conscious or intentional entities is ontological-
ly different from material things?7  
In this essay I discuss some of the problems with ontological realism 
and the concept of reality. I come to the conclusion that, unless a positive 
and sound definition of reality is provided, ontological realism runs the 
risk of missing its own target. Claiming that reality “does not depend” on 
our thoughts, mental schemes, or linguistic practices is intrinsically con-
fusing. Quite paradoxically, this merely negative definition of reality would 
be acceptable only in a dualistic perspective, that is, whenever one consid-
ers thoughts, mental schemes, etc. to be essentially different from the 
things “out there.” A negative definition of reality can be useful in some 
cases, but it eventually leaves too many questions unanswered.  
In the following pages I will discuss some of the arguments in the 
debate concerning ontological realism (§2). I will then focus on the tradi-
tional definition of reality as effectiveness, or capability of acting (§3). 
Finally, I will attempt to determine to what extent this definition is help-
ful in the debate concerning ontological realism (§4).  
 
 
2. Arguments Concerning Ontological Realism 
 
Despite the realists’ own intentions, ontological realism in the above 
described form tacitly posits a dualistic view of the world, in which sub-
jectivity plays a central role. A definition of reality as that which does not 
                                                                                                       
denying the existence of the world.  
7 Kit Fine correctly observes that “we appear to avoid the absurdities of skepticism but only 
by buying in to the obscurities of metaphysics.” Fine 2001, 4. As a solution for this 
dilemma, Fine sets the concept of “ground,” which cannot be discussed here.  
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depend on human thoughts, mental states, etc., eventually makes this 
dualism inescapable. On this view, things and mental states are poles 
apart, independent from each other. Ontological realists must necessari-
ly allow for a particular kind of reality of some kind (call it “conscious-
ness,” intentionality or anything else), from which things are declared to 
be independent: otherwise, the negative definition of reality would be-
come inconsistent.  
To resist this conclusion, the realist may add some positive element 
to the classical negative definition. Most frequently, realists appeal to 
perception, claiming that reality emerges from what we perceive. Having 
nothing to do with conceptual schemes, perception gives us direct access 
to reality. In this sense, realism also tends to be a reassertion of the in-
dependence of sensory data from further mental elaborations of any 
kind. Perceptions given by the senses – realists say – may be sometimes 
confusing; yet they cannot be always false. Descartes’ well-known doubts 
concerning the senses in his first Meditation may be attractive for arm-
chair philosophizing, but should nevertheless be rejected, since they fi-
nally lead to skepticism about the external world (or, less attractively, to 
the Cartesian solution).8  
Be that as it may, the argument of perception has two important func-
tions. In the first place, it softens the negative definition of reality and 
turns it into a half-negative definition. Ontological realists still believe that 
reality is independent of our thoughts, conceptual schemes, etc.; yet, they 
concede, reality is related to another, non-intellectual part of our mental 
activity, i.e. perception. As a consequence, reality and perception are 
strongly linked together and, as such, they are independent of abstract 
thoughts, conceptual schemes, etc. In this form, however, ontological real-
ism potentially clashes with scientific realism. Whether reality is made up 
of standard-size objects as shown by ordinary perception, or of subatomic 
particles, is a dilemma that cannot be eschewed.9 Within the sphere of the 
                                                 
8 As Descartes points out, we might be dreaming in this very moment, so that all of our 
representations would be false and deceptive; moreover, even if we are awake, an almighty 
and malicious god could make us erroneously believe that the world exists. Against 
Descartes, however, realists can still argue that in most cases what we see, touch, and hear, 
is actually what is there. See Descartes 1968.  
9 For a survey of some debates concerning scientific realism see e.g. Leplin 1984. A 
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present discussion, the most striking difference between scientific and on-
tological realism is that the former positively defines reality, according to 
what scientific knowledge tells us about it, whereas the latter does not. 
Thus, unless scientific realism is explicitly embraced, the realistic position 
remains uncertain with respect to a positive definition of reality.  
Secondly, and perhaps more importantly, the perception-grounded 
argumentation works as a deterrent against any temptation to define re-
ality. Reality – realists assert – has to be perceived, not “defined,” as if it 
were a conceptual construct or a linguistic convention. In a sense, this is 
an essential part of ontological realism’s argumentation. The very act of 
requiring a definition of reality ultimately reveals an anti-realistic stance; 
by contrast, arguing against the possibility of a definition of this kind is 
a typical realist move. In other words, asking for even a preliminary 
agreement about a conceptual definition of reality is too strong a condi-
tion, that can be legitimately rejected by realists. Nevertheless, at some 
stage realists and anti-realists should find an agreement about the mean-
ing they attribute to this contextually crucial word.  
 
 
3. The Traditional Definition of Reality 
 
Although it is not likely to solve the hitherto discussed problems, and 
despite the realist’s skepticism about definitions, an investigation into the 
meaning we should assign to the term ‘reality’ is a reasonable task within 
the general discussion concerning realism. As many other related general 
terms – ‘truth,’ ‘substance’ (or ‘thing’), ‘causality,’ etc. – reality has been 
the subject of innumerable philosophical discussions, which cannot be 
resumed here. Nevertheless, a quick historical look at some classical defi-
nitions of reality turns out to be a helpful tool for our present concern.  
Within the modern tradition, ‘reality’ has been often defined as effec-
tiveness, or capability of acting.10 In German, the word ‘Wirklichkeit’ 
                                                                                                       
discussion of this topic lies beyond the scope of the present essay.  
10 See e.g. Trappe 1971 cols. 829-846. The double usage of the Latin word realitas gives 
rise, in modern German, to two different words: ‘Wirklichkeit’ (a term often related to 
modal logic, situated between contingency and necessity) and ‘Realität’ (829). Remarkably, 
the entry of the Historisches Wörterbuch der Philosophie concerning the reality (Realität) of 
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(meaning reality) and the verb ‘wirken’, meaning acting, having an effect 
on something, share the same root. Germans also use the word ‘Realität’ 
for reality, sometimes with a slightly different meaning.11 For instance, 
whereas many nineteenth-century philosophers use ‘Realität’ for the 
subject of our discussion, Hermann Helmholtz talks about the Wirklich-
keit of the external world. For Helmholtz, things act (wirken) on our per-
ceptual system, triggering our various perceptions, according to the spe-
cific nature of the perceiving nervous apparatus.12 
Can the definition of reality as effectiveness solve some of the problems 
raised by ontological realism? Could an ontological realist adopt this defini-
tion, and with what effects? As we shall see, many ontological realists would 
probably resist the temptation to define reality in terms of effectiveness, 
since this definition diverts from a static ontology of things. Nevertheless, 
defining reality as effectiveness or capability of acting has considerable ad-
vantages. In the first place, it requires no involvement of intentional entities, 
so the above mentioned dualistic implications can be avoided. Reality is nei-
ther defined negatively as “what does not depend on” a certain intentional 
action, nor half-negatively as the counterpart of perception, but rather posi-
tively as effectiveness. Moreover, the capability of acting does not compel us 
to limit our attention to ordinary “material” things, that is, to regular-size 
objects suitable to bring about perceptions in a certain subject.  
In a sense, the negative definition of reality can be regarded as a special 
case within a general phenomenology of effectiveness. In fact, the negative 
definition identifies real things on the basis of their capability of acting on a 
certain subject. Things somehow provoke perceptions in the individual, and 
those perceptions cannot be changed or influenced by the individual’s 
thoughts, conceptual patterns, etc. By contrast, the definition of reality as 
effectiveness does not entail any limitation concerning the individual upon 
which the effect is exerted. This has remarkable consequences.  
In the first place, under this definition, there is no preliminary onto-
logical distinction between subjects and objects, or perceiver and the per-
ceived. Therefore, effectiveness could pertain to something, regardless of 
                                                                                                       
the external world (Grüneputt 1971) begins with Kant’s Refutation of Idealism.  
11 See Trappe 1971 col. 829. 
12 Helmholtz 1903 (1878).  
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its being endowed, or not, with intentionality. With this move, some of the 
difficulties previously discussed are overcome. Secondly, the clash be-
tween ontological commonsense realism and scientific realism is – at least 
– softened. The inevitable alternative (either standard-size objects or suba-
tomic entities) posed by these two theoretic options tends to fade and to 
give rise to a unified view. Whenever a certain effectiveness is captured, 
regardless of how it is captured (e.g., whether through ordinary perception 
or sophisticated scientific devices), we encounter reality.  
These remarks are surely far from offering a comprehensive theory. 
My intention is simply to draw attention to a relatively neglected aspect 
of the debate, suggesting that further conceptual clarifications are need-
ed concerning the very basic terms of the debate concerning realism.  
 
 
4. Conclusive Remarks 
 
Notwithstanding the above mentioned advantages, I suspect that 
many ontological realists are unlikely to embrace a definition of reality 
in terms of effectiveness. In many cases, in fact, what is at stake in the 
debate about ontological realism is not whether one is realist or not 
about the external world. Most people and most philosophers are indeed 
realists in this sense. Rather, the debate involves taking a position on on-
tology and its role within the body of the philosophical disciplines. 
Should we make preliminary decisions concerning ontology before we 
make any other philosophical move? From this perspective, the tendency 
towards a “new realism” actually corresponds to a revival of ontology as 
general metaphysics, that is, as a set of preliminary decisions about what 
exists, considered in its fundamental form.  
In my view, one can embrace realism without having to subscribe to 
fundamental ontology. Needless to say, ontology is an important part of 
philosophy. What should be avoided is the scholastic idea that ontology 
has some kind of priority over (any or most) other aspects of philosophy. 
Formal ontology and regional ontologies undoubtedly give many indis-
pensable contributions to phenomenology. By contrast, a general ontol-
ogy implying dogmatic realism is much less attractive, especially when it 
is imbued with foundationalist pretensions. With this, I do not mean to 
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advocate any form of commitment to anti-realism in ontology. Rather, 
one should subscribe to realism without compromising philosophical 
inquiries with a preliminary subdivision of the world into kinds or cate-
gories (the more so, if this subdivision runs tacitly), or with other fun-
damental ontological presumptions. My concluding historical remarks 
concern the Kantian origin of this philosophical stance. Kant famously 
argues for the replacement of ontology (general metaphysics) with the 
analytic of the intellect. He famously claimed that “the proud name of 
ontology” must “give way to the modest one of a mere analytic of the 
pure understanding.”13 Interestingly, acceptance of this philosophical 
suggestion can be given independently of adherence to the other issues 
of Kant’s philosophical program. It can be true that philosophy should 
dismiss ontological presumption, without the second part of the sen-
tence (that a good substitute for ontology is the analytic of pure intellect) 
being also necessarily true.14 Recent philosophical debates provide many 
examples of an ontological modesty totally disjointed from Kantian criti-
cism. Some philosophers argue that the ontological presumption should 
be tempered by evidence coming from the field of psychology, or of neu-
roscience. Even those who don’t subscribe to this view may develop oth-
er strategies, nearer to traditional philosophical investigation. The con-
ceptual analysis of the main terms involved – reality, to begin with – is 
surely one of the main tools available to us for these strategies. 
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